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Becoming hybrid: The negotiated order on the front line of public-private partnerships 
Abstract 
This paper examines how institutional tensions in the formation of hybrid public-private 
organisations are played out, and partially resolved, through micro-level interactions within 
everyday work. Drawing on the negotiated order perspective, our research examined how the 
‘context’, ‘processes’ and ‘outcomes’ of micro-level negotiations reflect and mitigate 
tensions between institutional logics. Our ethnographic study within a public-private 
organisation within the English healthcare system identified tensions within the hybrid 
context around organisational goals and values, work activities, hierarchies and the materials 
and technologies of work. We also identified processes of negotiation between actors, which 
contributed to negotiated settlements, at times combining elements of parent institutional 
logics, and at other times serving to keep parent logics distinct. The paper demonstrates the 






Hybridity has emerged as a prominent theme within contemporary studies of work and 
organisations (Oliver and Montgomery, 2000; Billis, 2010; Skelcher and Smith, 2014). This 
reflects the proliferation of new organisational and inter-organisational forms that combine 
ways of organising traditional associated with divergent institutional fields. A common 
illustration is the growth of inter-sectoral partnerships in the modernisation of public services, 
where the distinct resources, capabilities, and values of public, private and third sector 
organisations are combined to address complex problems (Brown et al., 2003; Evers, 2005; 
Ferlie et al., 2011; Mackintosh et al., 1994; Hodge et al., 2010; Osborne, 2009; Sorensen and 
Torfing, 2009).  
Hybridity poses important theoretical questions to organisational researchers, as it leads us to 
consider how contradictions between ‘genealogical parents’ (Oliver and Montgomery, 2000) 
are resolved, and the consequences for the character and sustainability of hybrids (Battilana 
and Dorado, 2010; Boland, et al., 2008; Evers, 2005).  These questions are underpinned by 
research that identifies key challenges in the formation of organisational hybrids. At the inter-
organisational level this includes problems of governance and decision-making where there 
are divergent understandings of accountability and risk (Boardman and Vining, 2010; Mair et 
al., 2015; Toms et al., 2011). At the organisational level this includes the struggle to establish 
organisational structures and processes that maintain the advantages of the parent 
organisations while satisfying divergent demands for market efficiency, professional 
collegiality and public value (Chambre, 2002; Miller, 2001; Thomasson, 2009; Stott and 
Tracey, 2007). At the interpersonal level this includes workplace conflicts created by 
contrasting forms of work organisation, management and/or finance, or about the purpose, 
meaning, and value of work (Hebson et al., 2003; Sanders and McCellen, 2012; Smith 2012).  
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The above challenges have been interpreted as stemming from institutional differences 
between parent organisations (Oliver and Montgomery, 2000). In particular, the institutional 
logics perspective considers how hybrid organisations are formed through the interaction, 
mediation and resolution of multiple institutional logics. It offers an analytical approach that 
highlights the connections and contradictions between field level institutions, organisational 
practices and individual identities (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Skelcher and Smith, 2014). That 
said, the institutional analysis of hybrids has predominantly remained at the inter-
organisational and organisational level (Reay and Hinings, 2009; Smets and Jarzabkowski, 
2013). However, it has long been recognised that organisational forms are contingent upon, 
and emergent through the situated work of ‘street level’ actors (Lipsky, 1980). Institutional 
theory more broadly has begun to focus on the micro-level determinants of institutional 
phenomenon (Lawrence et al., 2009; Powell and Colyvas, 2008). This suggests emerging 
hybrid configurations are not only the product of field level institutions, but also the ways 
divergent institutions are articulated, mediate and reconstituted through the practices and 
strategies of micro-level actors. Adopting this view, our paper addresses the recent call for 
research on the micro processes of hybridisation (Battilana and Lee, 2014), especially the 
‘process by which plural institutional logics are constructed, contested, and negotiated, the 
ways in which settlements are reached between them’ (Skelcher and Smith, 2014: 13).  
The approach taken in this paper is informed by Strauss’ negotiated order perspective 
(Strauss et al., 1963; Strauss, 1978). This directs attention away from the structural 
determinates of organisational practices, to the micro-level negotiations through which work 
practices and organisational processes become routinized as relatively stable social order. 
This approach offers an important contribution to the prevailing institutional perspective and 
addresses appeals for research to re-focusing on everyday work (Bechky, 2011). Specifically, 
our paper asks how micro-level negotiations within emerging hybrid organisations reflect and 
4  
reconcile broader institutional tensions and how these negotiations contribute to the new 
hybrid organisational order.  
Presenting an ethnographic study of a recent public-private hybrid in the English health 
sector, our paper makes three contributions. First we present a novel empirical account to 
develop a conceptual framework for understanding the relationships between the context, 
processes and outcomes of negotiation. Second, we develop an understanding of how 
integrative and distributive negotiations contribute to a dynamic view of hybridisation, in 
which elements of organisations can move towards particular parent logics, or become 
blended between logics, through interpersonal interaction. Third, we contribute to the 
longstanding negotiated order perspective by linking this work to contemporary theorising on 
institutional logics, elaborating the concept of structural context through understanding of 
institutional heterogeneity.  
 
Managing institutional tensions in hybrid forms 
The institutional logics perspective emphasises how modes of organising are shaped by 
prevailing symbolic systems and historical patterns of material practice that provide the 
frames of references through which social practices are produced and reproduced (Friedland 
and Alford; 1991 Thornton, 2004). From this perspective, logics frame actors’ decisions to 
produce modes of organising that are logic consistent. It is increasingly recognised, however, 
that institutional fields can by characterised by multiple, sometimes competing or blurred 
logics (Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2010). With particular reference to 
organisational hybridity, the institutional logic perspective brings to light how multiple logics 
can combine or compete to promote novel practices, identities and modes of organising 
5  
(Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2010; Pache and Santos, 2013a; Purdy and 
Gray, 2009; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). The presence of multiple logics is particularly 
evident in the context of contemporary public service reforms where reconfiguration of the 
institutional boundaries between sectors creates conflict between logics of professionalism, 
state bureaucracy, the market and social welfare (Billis, 2010; Kitchener, 2002; Meyer et al., 
2014, Reay and Hinings, 2009).   
One long-recognised way organisations can maintain legitimacy in the face of competing 
institutional pressures or logics is through institutional de-coupling (Basu, et al., 1999; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowen, 1977). That is, organisations exhibit 
conformity to one logic through ‘front stage’ symbolic displays, but conformity to another in 
their ‘backstage’ activities. More recent studies of hybrid organisations develop the idea of 
‘blended’ responses to heterogeneous logics (Skelcher and Smith, 2014; Pache and Santos, 
2013a; Reay and Hinings, 2009). Drawing together recent literature, Battilana and Lee (2014) 
identify how social enterprises overcome tensions in parent logics by configuring and 
combining different organisational ‘elements’ to adhere to one or the other logic, including 
inter-organisational relationships, culture, organisational design, workforce composition and 
organisational activities. Similarly, Pache and Santos (2013b) identify several potential 
reactions to competing institutional demands within hybrids, namely; ignorance, compliance, 
resistance, combination or compartmentalisation, with individuals’ reactions influenced by 
their previous relations to each of the parent institutions.  
To date, however, the institutional logics perspective has tended to focus on the ‘top-down’ 
influence of field-level institutional differences, with less consideration of how micro-level 
practices involve the interpretation, negotiation and re-constitution of these tensions to 
influence the hybrid organisational form (McPherson and Saunder, 2013; Smets et al., 2012). 
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The scope for micro-level practices to influence emergent organisational forms is particularly 
significant during periods of public-private hybridisation where the amalgamation of 
prevailing institutions create ambiguities and opportunities for change. Importantly, these 
micro-level processes involve interaction between actors accustomed to divergent forms of 
work organisation, and professional groups who may be expected to shape the resultant 
organisational form. To address this gap we draw upon the negotiated order perspective.  
 
The negotiated order of cross-sector hybrids 
Following in the symbolic interactionist tradition, Strauss and colleagues advanced the 
negotiated order perspective as an alternative to more structural sociology, suggesting that 
social order emerges from the on-going micro negotiations of social actors (Day and Day, 
1977; Goffman, 1983; Strauss, 1978). These negotiations create, maintain and transform 
social organisation and, in turn, social institutions. Studying the social organisation of 
psychiatric care, Strauss et al., (1963) showed how formal structures and rules only partially 
directed the organisation of social relationships between doctors, nurses and patients, with 
formal rules ‘stretched, negotiated and argued about’ in day-to-day interactions (p.153). For 
example, the timing and distribution of work; accepted values and goals; inter-group 
relations; and demarcations between professional groups were all negotiated through micro-
level interactions (see also Abbott, 1988; Svensson, 1996). 
Although the negotiated order concept can lack specificity (Allen, 1997), past research 
typically highlights three elements of the negotiation process. First, there are (more or less 
explicit) disagreements about given activities or situations; second, interactions around these 
disagreements are characterised by processes of negotiation or exchange, rather than direct 
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authority or force; and third, settlements are reached that maintain or transform social order 
(Day and Day, 1977; Maines and Charlton, 1985; Strauss, 1978; Maines, 1982; Mesler, 1989; 
Thomas, 1984; O’Toole and O’Toole, 1981). Extant literature has identified forms of 
negotiation including trade-offs, deals and pacts, compromises, exchanges and silent bargains 
(Day and Day, 1977; Maines, 1982; Mesler, 1989; Thomas, 1984; O’Toole and O’Toole, 
1981). Although these are often richly described, there is no typology of negotiations that 
links negotiations to outcomes.  
Of relevance to our study is the role of social structure, or divergent institutional logics, in 
both precipitating and being re-constituted through negotiation. Like other interactionist 
studies, the negotiated order perspective has been criticised for neglecting the influence of 
structure, formal rules and historical practices (Day and Day, 1977; Fine, 1984). However, 
Strauss’ work makes explicit reference to these structural influences as both triggering and 
framing negotiation. Later work described the recursive process by which the ‘structural 
context’ – established relationships, rules and hierarchies – and the specific ‘negotiation 
context’ – the disagreement, actors and opportunities for interaction – frame interactions, 
which contribute to emergent social order (Maines, 1982). For example, changing structural 
contexts are more likely to give rise to significant disagreement and overt negotiations whilst 
stable contexts foster tacit social agreements (Allen, 1997; Halls and Spencer, 1982).  
The negotiation order perspective provides a relevant conceptual approach for the 
institutional analysis of hybrid organisation; specifically how micro-level negotiations reflect 
and reconcile underlying institutional tensions, and contribute to the new hybrid 
organisational order. In light of recent institutional theory, the structural context for hybrid 
organisations can be viewed in terms of the constellation of supra-organisational institutional 
logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004), which also shape the local ‘negotiating 
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context’ in terms of the tangible disagreements and interactional opportunities around which 
negotiations transpire. Elaborating this idea, programs of hybridisation alter the ‘structural 
context’ by bringing together multiple institutional logics, in our case the public and private 
sector, with each placing potentially contradictory obligations on behaviour and exposing 
actors to material practices and symbolic systems from which they have been previously 
insulated (Thornton et al., 2012). Studies of outsourcing, contracting and strategic 
partnerships have shown how new inter-organisational arrangements generate multiple points 
of cross-boundary interaction, outside of the formal organisational hierarchy (Brannen and 
Salk, 2000; Marchington, et al., 2005; Nathan and Mitroff, 1991). Further, these interactions 
can be the site for uncertainty and conflict within the workplace (Rubery et al., 2004; Smith, 
2012; Marchington et al., 2005).  
Combining the negotiated order view with the institutional logics perspective provides a 
distinct theoretical basis for understanding the antecedent structural conditions of 
negotiations within hybrid organisations and the potential for negotiations to contribute to 
hybrid configurations. Building on this, we ask how micro-level negotiations within 
emerging hybrid organisations reflect and reconcile underlying structural tensions associated 
with divergent parent logics, and how these negotiations contribute to the new hybrid 
organisational order. To answer these questions, our study explores a case of public-private 
partnership (PPP) in healthcare, introduced below.  
 
Case study: Public-private partnerships in healthcare 
On a global level, public and private partnerships (PPPs) have become central to the 
modernisation of public services, involving many forms of collaborations and agreements 
9  
between public and practice organisations (Hodge et al., 2010). Mirroring the literature on 
hybrids, literature on PPPs has tended to focus on structural or ‘upstream’ issues, commonly 
including typologies of partnership configuration, financial contracting and the governance of 
risk (Hodge et al., 2010; Osborne, 2009).  
Beyond this, research has described how embedded institutional differences between sectors 
impacts on the nature of relations between partner organisations (Field and Peck, 2003; Klijn 
and Teisman; 2003). For example, studies have investigated the impact of such differences on 
performance objectives, employment relations and the supply of labour, as well as public 
service cultures, identities and work practices (Marchington et al., 2005; MacKenzie, 2000; 
2008; Rubery et al., 2004). This latter work demonstrates how privatisation and public sector 
sub-contracting can lead to disordered hierarchies and complex power relationships as high 
status, skilled and specialised public service work is transferred to third party providers. 
While such studies highlight tensions within PPPs, they have tended to focus on 
organisational management and the impact on workforce, rather than the scope for these 
tensions to provide the foundations for negotiation, hybridisation or wider institutional 
change.  
The English National Health Service (NHS) is an exemplary focus for investigating the 
negotiated order of hybrid organisations. Since the late 1990s, NHS reforms have involved 
the co- or private-financing of new hospital buildings, based on relatively ‘loose’ contractual 
arrangements (Hodge et al., 2010). Since the early 2000s, policies have extended 
opportunities for public and private sector organisations to work in more ‘tight’ relationships 
in the design and delivery of frontline services, including relatively new modes of service 
organisation. As an example of increasingly ‘tight’ public-private relations, our case 
examines the introduction of an Independent Sector Treatment Centre (ISTC) between 2009 
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and 2011. ISTC were introduced to expand provision of and promote innovation in public 
healthcare through involving private companies in the financing, organisation and 
management of non-urgent or elective care.  
ISTCs are an important site of hybridisation for several reasons. First, healthcare remains a 
prominent site for analysing the interaction and hybridisation of divergent logics, and 
previous research has extensively described how the dominant professional-bureaucratic 
logic of healthcare has been challenged by commercial and market-managerial logics in 
marketisation reforms (Reay and Hinings, 2009; Scott, 2001; Kitchener, 2002), providing the 
institutional context for this study. Second, ISTCs illustrate a fundamental change in the 
organising of English healthcare, representing one of the first examples of private companies 
assuming responsibility for managing public acute healthcare through long-term partnership 
(Gabbay 2011; Pollock and Godden, 2008; Waring and Bishop, 2011). Third, through 
assuming responsibility for the delivery of NHS services, private companies are required to 
manage health professionals previously employed in NHS hospitals, creating a multi-
employer, multi-sectoral workplace and opening new sites for cross-sector interaction. ISTCs 
therefore provide a novel site for the analysis of hybrid organisations as a negotiated order, 
with public clinical staff and private managers brought together to produce health services 
within new workplace relations. 
Our case study ISTC was developed through partnership between public sector (NHS) 
commissioners and hospitals, and a private healthcare firm (‘UKHealth’), a new market 
entrant with financial support of a larger European healthcare company. This ISTC involved 
the construction of a new hospital facility, with 13 medical specialisms transferred from a 
local NHS hospital to the privately managed facility. Services were commissioned by the 
local NHS, with an annual value of approximately £40million for an initial five years. The 
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ISTC was led by senior executives and middle managers from UKHealth. A large pool of 
clinicians (approximately 800) were seconded from the local NHS hospital on either a 
‘sessional’ or full time basis, including nurses, doctors, healthcare assistants, technicians and 
administrators. For these staff, NHS terms and conditions of work were protected within the 
ISTC. 
The research involved an 18-month ethnographic study covering the design, development and 
opening of the ISTC. Ethnography allowed for rich contextual insight into the day-to-day 
organisation of work within the ISTC, including close attention to micro-level negotiations 
(Fischer and Dirsmith, 1995). Following an ethnographic approach, our study aimed to 
develop an insiders’ perspective and to locate the situated and negotiated meanings of 
different staff groups within a wider organisational context (Fetterman, 1998). Over 300 hour 
of observations were conducted within non-clinical and administrative settings, e.g. 
management meetings and training events; and in a range of clinical settings including wards, 
clinics and operating rooms. These were recorded in hand-written field journals, before being 
typed-up. The observations examined how work practices were established through the 
interaction between ISTC policies and procedures, and pre-existing clinical practices and 
customs carried over from the NHS.  
Alongside observations, a large number of informal interviews were carried out to develop 
observations, also recorded in field journals. In addition, 38 semi-structured recorded and 
transcribed interviews were carried out with different staff representatives to explore their 
experiences of work organisation in the ISTC (respondents listed in table 1 below; some role 
are generalised for anonymity). Documentary evidence was collected, including contract 
terms, standard operating procedures, patient pathways, regulations, key performance 
indicators (KPIs), work role descriptions and employment contracts.  
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ISTC work role (full 
time in ISTC unless 
stated) 
Career background prior to ISTC 
Doctor 1,2,3,4 Consultant anesthetists 
(1/2 – 1 day per week) 
Trained and full career in NHS (average18 years) 
Doctor 5,6,7,8 Consultant surgeons (1/2 
– 1 day per week) 
Trained and full career in NHS (average 16.5 years) 
Doctor 9,10  Registrar surgeons (1 day 
per week)  
Trained and full career in NHS (average 8 years) 
Doctor 11 Consultant physician (2 
days per week) 
Trained overseas (12 years). Worked in NHS (5 years)  
Sister 1 Department lead nurse  Trained and worked in NHS (8 years), recently in 
Private hospital (5 years) 
Sister 2 Department lead nurse Trained and worked overseas (11 years), worked in 
NHS (4 years) 
Sister 3, 4 Department lead nurse Trained and full career in NHS (average 16 years) 
Nurse 1,2,3,4, 
5,6,7,8,9,10 
Staff grade nurse Trained and full career NHS (average 14 years) 
Nurse 11 Staff grade nurse Trained overseas (7 years). Worked in NHS (4 years)  
ODP 1 Operating department 
practitioner 
Trained in NHS. Full career in private hospitals (13 
years) 
ODP 2, 3 Operating department 
practitioner 
Trained and full career in NHS (average 14 years) 
HCA 1, 2 Healthcare assistant Trained and full career in NHS (average 4 years) 
UKHealth 
manager 1 
Planning and contract 
manager 




Planning and contract 
manager 








Senior function manager NHS manager (6 years) 
UKHealth 
manager 5 
Senior function manager  Retail management (18 years) 
UKHealth 
manager 6 
Senior exec manager  Consultant surgeon, trained and worked NHS (15 
years). Worked in private hospital (13 years) 
UKHealth 
manager 7 
Senior exec manager Consultant surgeon trained and worked NHS (10 years). 
Worked private hospital (8 years) 
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Data analysis initially involved open coding of data in light of the sensitising concepts and 
debates informing the study. This was followed by iterative coding, whereby data was subject 
to close reading and thematic analysis; and where authors regularly met to review codes to 
determine their consistency, boundaries and relationships. Through this process of constant 
comparison and relating codes back to existing theories, conceptual categories and themes 
were developed. The case narrative is presented to convey the tensions underpinning cross-
sector interactions within the new ISTC before moving on to highlight processes of 
interpersonal negotiation. 
Findings 
Logic tensions and workplace disagreements 
Our findings first describe how the ISTC represented a novel site in which the prevailing 
professional-bureaucratic logic of the NHS and the market-managerial logic of UKHealth 
were brought together. The ISTC was seen by the UKHealth planning team as an opportunity 
for a radical change in English publicly funded healthcare, which has been dominated by 
NHS organisations. However, the realisation of this vision required working closely with, and 
securing the cooperation of, the NHS clinical workforce whose work was transferred into the 
ISTC. Interviews highlighted notable tensions between the underpinning logics of UKHealth 
managers and NHS clinicians, centred around issues of service values and goals, working 
practices, systems of hierarchy, and the material and technological aspects of work (Table 2).  
While interviews were helpful in identifying institutional tensions at an abstract level, 
observations within the workplace allowed us to elaborate specific episodes of disagreement 
between UKHealth and NHS clinicians associated with each of these tensions. These were 
especially prominent within points of routine cross-boundary interaction between public and 
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private actors, including daily departmental meetings with UKHealth managers and senior 
NHS nurses, weekly management walk-arounds and briefing sessions, and senior-level 
management and governance meetings between UKHealth executives and NHS medical 
leaders. These interactions were prominent sites for ‘issues’ and ‘problems’ to be explicitly 
worked out.  Table 2 summarises the emergent tensions, illustrative workplace disagreements 
as well as provisional settlements, described further below. 
<INSERT TABLE 2 CONFLICTS AND NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT HERE> 
Processes of negotiation  
The study identified a number of negotiation processes and tactics through which UKHealth 
and NHS clinicians worked through and sought to resolve the disagreements emerging in the 
creation of the ISTC.  
Forming coalitions and relationships: One common way NHS clinicians sought to negotiate 
new forms of work organisation within the ISTC was to draw support from embedded social 
networks carried over their former NHS hospital. These were used to resist new ways of 
working and re-assert customary practices established within the NHS. Although contractual 
and bureaucratic rules placed all NHS staff under the supervision of UKHealth managers, 
considerable informal (interpersonal) and formal (professional and expert) forms of influence 
were retained amongst NHS group cultures and occupational hierarchies. For example, NHS 
doctors maintained close collegial relations with other doctors within their specialisms, and 
nurses continued to report to their senior grade nurses or doctors, rather than to UKHealth 
managers.  
‘Definitely I think the [NHS] clinical leads have the most weight and the most 
control’ (Sister 2) 
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‘If [anaesthetists] say ‘I won’t do the anaesthetic’ what can you do?  You can’t say 
‘well I will go and get another anaesthetist then’, you could try but you wouldn’t find 
one.’ (Sister 1) 
Clinical networks were used to resist new ways of working and re-assert customary practices 
established within the NHS. A prominent example of this was observed with doctors’ 
reactions to a new off-site patient booking centre. This had been initiated by UKHealth 
managers to allow central management of patient appointments in line with contracted 
waiting times. However, doctors saw this as undermining their ability to safely manage their 
own caseload and prioritise patients according to the clinical expertise. 
‘Previously I would just sit down with my secretary and […] generally we got it right. 
But here you had no idea how many patients were on the list and how many would 
turn up. It could be two it could be twenty, and it was just impossible’ (Doctor 7) 
 After an initial period of using the new system, senior doctors collected anecdotal evidence 
about the problems their medical colleagues were experiencing and organised meetings to 
present a collective response to UKHealth managers. While managers were immediately 
dismissive of  ‘the old guard’, they also recognised patient throughput was below target; and 
following sustained collective lobbying from doctors, the decision was made to bring this 
administrative function into the ISTC main building under placing it back under medical 
control.  
‘I found it frustrating because I always used to just pop into my secretary who was 
doing the booking and make sure we were going to be maximising utilisation and 
make any small changes that might need to be made […] its been a bit of a struggle 
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but I am working my way back to the system that we used to have [in the NHS 
hospital] that worked really well’ (Doctor 8) 
UKHealth managers acknowledged these existing clinical networks presented a significant 
challenge to their aspirations for service innovation. As patterns of relationships were 
increasingly understood, managers purposefully identified senior nurses and other clinicians 
with high levels of influence within peer networks. These ‘local leaders’ were then the focus 
of attempts to build cross-organisational cooperation and managers worked to persuade them 
of the benefits of change. 
‘We are really trying now to bridge the gap and get some of the key people to come 
with us on this, to see how we can do things better’ (UKHealth manager 6) 
Rhetoric and legitimacy: A second related process of negotiation was the use of rhetorical 
arguments to promote preferred ways of working and undermine the coherence or legitimacy 
of alternate perspectives. In episodes of disagreement, NHS staff would typically position 
their arguments in terms clinical expertise and experience, and challenge aspects of the ISTC 
along three lines. First, clinicians argued that proposed changes would undermine clinical 
standards and threaten quality, for example promoting quantity over safety. In this regard, 
appeals were made to ‘professional’ standards and regulations that were seen as superseding 
local organisational expectations. Second clinicians argued similar initiatives had already 
been tried in the NHS and shown to be ineffective. This appeared to be an effective strategy 
as UKHealth managers often wanted to be seen as innovative and not replicating activities 
found in the NHS. Third, clinicians promoted their collective wisdom and argued that their 
proximity to the ‘frontline’ made them better placed to devise change.  
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“I don’t think [the UKHealth managers] can understand that one assessment can take 
ten minutes and another can take an hour and a half, [they] expect everybody to get 
through within the set time of twenty minutes and it isn’t always possible’’ (Nurse 6) 
‘Some of us have been doing this together for about twenty years, if there was a way 
to save time and make things more efficient do you not think we would have done it 
by now?’ (Sister 3) 
In light of resistance, UKHealth managers increasingly appreciated the need to convince 
NHS staff of the value and necessity of new ISTC approaches to work. UKHealth managers 
had initially presented a vision of stark transformational change and dramatic increases in 
efficiency, but in the face of clinicians arguments this was consciously moderated, with 
managers adopting ‘softer’ rhetoric that emphasised shared values around improving services 
for patients and the potential to expand successful services. Change was advocated in terms 
of the benefits for patients and professionals, rather than the organisation. 
‘Our rational for doing the TC in the first place and for the Trust to engage in it is it 
would be a catalyst for change and it would kind of shine a light on the way we do 
things at the moment. And we would get real opportunities that we could transfer 
from patient to patient’ (UKHealth manager 1) 
 ‘We are really having to enforce that message now, we are for the NHS patients of 
[the city] and this is a government backed initiative’ (UKHealth Manager 4).   
On an individual level, NHS staff were asked to help ‘find the best solutions together’ 
(UKHealth Manager 3). These messages were put forward through a series of education and 
training initiatives, aimed at spreading new norms of practice. 
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“We hold fortnightly ‘Change’ workshops for staff developing on some of the 
differences around the way things have to be managed in the independent sector, to 
improve their familiarity with the regulations” (UKHealth Manager 3)   
In adopting these messages, the relationship between the NHS and UKHealth was re-cast 
from one of contractual competition, to one based on partnership and joint-working. This 
could be seen as an attempt to mitigate the extent of difference between public and private 
objective and present a sense of continuity for NHS.  
‘Its a constant education I think from our point of view that we need to get NHS 
people on board with a more sort of business perspective […] but at the end of the day 
we have to be very balanced about this because there is often a patient at the end of all 
these decisions’ (UKHealth Manager 5) 
Trade off and bargains: A third process of negotiation was for UKHealth managers and NHS 
clinicians to identify trade-offs and bargains to balance divergent understandings of work. 
The clearest example of explicit deal-making was the move to offer financial incentive to 
doctors working in the ISTC. This included offering share purchase options as well as 
bonuses for hitting targeted volumes.  
“We want to make it so it’s in their interests to treat patients as efficiently as 
absolutely possible” (UKHealth Manager 6).  
Although these were often presented as rewards for meeting performance targets, they might 
also be interpreted as compensating doctors’ for compliance and support for new ways of 
working.  For example, productivity bonuses were offered alongside UKHealth management 
attempts to publish individual and departmental performance measures on throughput and 
quality. This met with a mixed response from doctors, with some welcoming financial 
19  
incentives linked to more transparent performance and others concerned about encroaching 
commercial imperatives onto medical work. 
‘To be honest, doctors are quite a competitive lot and I think it is quite interesting 
seeing where I sit [in terms of performance against other doctors]’ (Doctor 8)  
‘Some doctors may think its brilliant to rush patients’ through and make lots of 
money, others might be more resistant to that’ (Doctor 2) 
However, many senior doctors did accept financial incentives. This group were increasingly 
present at strategic and senior level meetings, took a pro-active interest in ISTC objectives 
and adopted visible roles persuading other colleagues to engage with the ISTC and bridge the 
gap between UKHealth managers and NHS clinicians.  
For other staff groups, UKHealth managers identified different incentives for accepting new 
ways of working. For example, senior nurses were formally ‘handed back’ departmental 
management responsibilities such as team composition, workload planning and recruitment. 
For nurses, this arrangement was welcome because it was seen as returning control over 
clinical areas and enabled them to counter the perceived dangers of privatised healthcare, 
such as prioritising throughout over quality. For managers, this arrangement also had benefits 
as it reduced the need for direct management oversight of clinical work, and increased the 
involvement of clinical leaders in decision-making and change processes.   
‘We have got more control now over who we get in. Some of the people they were 
recruiting were just not up to our standard so this is a big step forward’ (Sister 3) 
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‘We’ve now made lots [of changes to UKHealth work plans]. Some we have actually 
taken a bit further now and we are starting to look more at the patients pathway i.e. 
how do we get that patient to theatre in as quickly a time as possible’ (Sister 1) 
As these quotes suggest, trading-off control over clinical work for the active engagement of 
staff, alongside attempts to build new relationships and modify rhetoric, did appear to 
stimulate points of cooperation, and led to clinical leaders accepting some responsibility for 
delivering performance and throughput targets of the ISTC.  
Outcomes of negotiations 
The above negotiated processes appeared to allow provisional settlements to several early 
points of disagreements between NHS staff and UKHealth managers (see table 2). Seen 
together, settlements contributed to a number of important changes to the hybrid 
organisational arrangements. First, there was a redefinition and refocusing of the remit or 
reach of management in the organisation of clinical tasks. UKHealth managers partially 
withdrew from departmental level administration and narrowed their focus on wider contract 
management, and the overarching performance of the ISTC, including issues of finance and 
accounting, marketing, collecting performance data and preparing for inspections and quality 
reports.  
‘Obviously we don’t see the financial side of things; we just see what surgery needs to 
be done and what equipment and work is needed to support that.  Someone else is 
looking at where the best place is to get the cheapest equipment that works and all 
that kind of stuff, obviously they have that mentality because it is a business’ (Sister 
2)  
21  
‘I think the lines are now a lot more blurred and the clinical side is better […] but the 
business side there are certainly still differences’ (Doctor  8) 
Second, stemming from the above, NHS clinicians reclaimed, and in some instances gained, 
influence in service administration, from day-to-day task allocation to involvement in 
strategic planning. For example, doctors with financial interests in the company played an 
active role in organisational development, and senior nurses were given increased responsible 
for meeting throughput targets. This was reflected in the increasing willingness of certain 
NHS clinical staff to engage with the development of the ISTC. 
 ‘[UKHealth] are very pro wanting you to make it work and wanting you to develop 
the centre as you want to develop it.  You do feel that you have got more scope to do 
that.’ (Sister 1)  
Third, while there continued to be tensions between UKHealth managers and NHS clinical 
staff, there was a common feeling that relations between these groups had ‘settled down’ over 
the first year of operation. Settlements for individual disagreements could be seen to set 
precedents for reciprocity and helped to set ground rules for cross-boundary cooperation. 
 ‘You have to have that little bit of give and take and you work with people over time 
and you get to know how they work, you get to know what they are capable of and 
how far they are willing to help you’ (Sister 2) 
 ‘I would say three months ago I would have seriously considered going back to an 
NHS hospital […] I enjoy working here now and that is probably because things have 
settled down, there is still the odd teething problem in my book that shouldn’t be 
happening, but in the main things are better.’ (Nurse 7)   
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Negotiated settlements were also reflected in improvements in overall organisational 
performance markers. Over the first six months of operation, there were several breaches of 
key performance indicator (KPIs); of 30 contractual KPIs set, six were breached on a 
majority of months. Of particular note, patient complaints were several times higher than the 
contracted rate, and patients care episodes were less than half expected levels. In the second 
six months of opening, care episodes had more than doubled and patient complaints were 
reduced to below target levels. Although there were still regular breaches of three KPIs 
related to administrative issues, what were seen as the important targets had been met. 
Discussion and conclusions 
Previous research on organisational responses to competing institutional logics often takes as 
its starting point ‘upstream’ organisational design or configuration (Battilana and Lee, 2014, 
Pache and Santos, 2013a; Skelcher and Smith, 2014). There has been less attention, however, 
to the ways in which micro-level interactions both reflect and re-constitute broader 
institutional tensions. Our study examines these micro-level interactions informed by Strauss’ 
(1978) negotiated order perspective, which brings to light the emergence of social order and 
patterns of organising through negotiation strategies of actors embedded within day-to-day 
organisational life. For our case study, we have examined the interaction of private sector 
managers and public sector health professionals brought together in a hybrid public-private 
partnership. Reflecting on the findings above, and building on extant literature, we develop a 
conceptual framework addressing the contribution of micro-level negotiations to the 





The first stage of our framework draws upon previous research showing how actors from the 
public and private sector adhere to professional-bureaucratic and market-efficiency logics 
characteristic of these respective domains (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Kitchener, 2002; 
Klijn and Teisman; 2003; Scott, 2001; Reay et al., 2006). Programmes of hybridisation bring 
together organisations operating under differing constellations of institutional logics, and in 
our case this is shown to create a number of tensions in terms of: values and goals, work 
processes, hierarchy and the material and technological aspects of work (see table 2). The 
combinations of societal level institutional logics (Thornton, 2004) represent what Strauss’ 
work (1978) might interpret as the wider ‘structural context’ of negotiation, as they provide 
the overriding source of tension and disagreement. 
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The second stage of our framework identifies how logic tensions result in specific workplace 
disagreements within the hybrid organisational context. Logic tensions were not only present 
in the abstract reflections of those affected, but were revealed in specific episodes of 
disagreement between private managers and public clinical staff in interactions spanning 
previous organisational and sectoral boundaries. The formation of the ISTC involved the 
creation of new spatial and temporal opportunities for communication between sectors, 
bringing competing logics into direct confrontation in the course of every day work. As 
identified in previous research (Hebson, et al., 2003; Klijn and Teisman, 2003), cross-sector 
relationships represented sites of conflict as the overarching differences between parent 
logics became manifest in contrasting approaches to work organisation, priorities and 
performance. At the same time, our case identified how establishing points of difference and 
disagreement within these relationships provided the foundations for new forms social order 
to be established (Hall and Spencer, 1987; Nathan and Mitroff, 1991). These might be 
interpreted as the specific ‘negotiation context’ that triggers and frames how negotiations 
unfold over time (Strauss, 1978). 
The third stage of our framework identifies how processes of negotiation contribute to 
dynamic change under the ‘push and pull’ of competing logics. In our case, we identify how 
negotiations involved the utilisation of ‘embedded networks’ to present opposition resistance, 
the performance of ‘rhetorical arguments’ to question or establish the legitimacy of change 
and the development of ‘deals and exchanges’ to secure cooperation. In each, different types 
of resources appeared to shape how negotiations played out, and the type of settlement 
reached, including social networks or capital, claims to expertise, standards or quality, and 
access to additional material resources. Significantly, these key resources of negotiations are 
rarely made explicit in existing research on negotiated order (Fine, 1984). Through these 
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negotiation processes, individual disagreement were provisionally settled, which in turn 
mitigated wider institutional tensions.  
Drawing terms from the field of conflict resolution (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985), we elaborate 
our findings to suggest the mediation of competing institutional logics through micro-level 
negotiations might be characterised in one of two ways. First, we found examples of 
distributive negotiations, characterised by a search for concessions weighted towards one or 
other parent logics, such as attempting to divide the business and clinical responsibilities 
between the private and public groups. Second, we saw examples of integrative negotiations 
characterised by a search for novel resolutions that seek to satisfy multiple logics 
simultaneously such as the attempt to identify mutual values through ‘softer’ forms of 
rhetoric demonstrated by the private managers. Viewing negotiations on a spectrum of 
distribution to integration furthers understanding of the process by which episodes of 
negotiation relate to the wider structural context by considering how negotiations fit within 
conflicting institutional logics. 
The final stage of our framework identifies how distributive and integrative negotiations at 
the individual level contribute to hybridisation at the organisational level. Returning to the 
work of Battilana and Lee’s (2014), we find negotiation processes shaping the position of 
different ‘elements’ that make up the hybrid organisation, so that each element has the 
potential to become more ‘blended’ to multiple logics, or segregated between logics. Relating 
our case findings to these elements: 1) Organisational design involved an increasing split 
between parent logics as NHS staff gained authority over clinical activities and UKHealth 
focused on financial and administrative matters. 2) Organisational activities moved 
increasingly towards a professional-bureaucratic logic as clinical staff re-asserted existing 
ways of working, albeit accepting limited forms of change. 3) Workforce composition 
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although largely fixed by contract, involved some movement towards a professional-
bureaucratic logic as clinical leaders gained increasing involvement in the recruitment of 
‘private’ staff. 4) Organisational culture became increasing blended between logics as 
relationships developed and managers sought points of convergence around clinical quality 
and patient care. 5) Inter-organisational relationships involved an increasingly complex mix 
of professional-bureaucratic and market-efficiency forms, as multiplex contractual, reciprocal 
and hierarchical imperatives influenced relations between public and private actors at the 
micro level, representing a key interface between partner organisations at the meso level.  
Overall, this presents a processual view of hybridisation that links macro institutional 
tensions to micro-level negotiations and the resultant hybrid form. Specifically, differences in 
supra-organisational logics lead to disagreements within the negotiating context, within 
which subsequent micro level negotiations contribute to the positioning of each 
organisational element against competing parent logics. Through this process each 
organisational element can become more ‘blended’ to multiple logics, or segregated between 
logics, over time. Our study contributes to the growing literature on PPPs and the changing 
relationship between the public and private sector more generally, by directing attention 
beyond the structural features of inter-organisational or inter-sectoral working to present a 
more fine-grained and dynamic picture of negotiated and emergent hybridisation.  
Supporting previous research on the lived-experience, processes and contradictions within 
public service outsourcing (Grimshaw et al., 2002; Hebson et al., 2003; MacKenzie 2000, 
2002; Smith, 2012), our study challenges the managerialist and functional assumptions 
embedded within policy-led programs of market and contractual public service reforms. In 
line with these studies, we illustrate how taxonomic distinctions between bureaucratic and 
market controls are problematic when considering complex public service sectors operating 
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under multiple forms of regulation and control. Such work provides theoretical and empirical 
evidence against simplistic notions of market efficiency, as well more developed arguments 
for ‘boundaryless’ networks to promote flows of resources between sectors.  
To conclude, our paper contributes to the growing body of research concerned with analysing 
how tensions between institutional logics evident in the formation of hybrid organisations are 
further manifest in and managed through micro-level negotiations. This presents a picture of 
hybrids as potentially volatile ‘mixtures’ rather than ‘solutions’, as negotiated settlements 
remain open to on-going revision and tensions in the institutional foundations of hybrids are 
provisionally settled in view of local contexts of work. This study was limited to a single case 
within a specific type of PPP in the context of UK healthcare. To further identify how the 
process of hybridisation shapes how organisational elements are brought together, additional 
work is needed on the interactional level in new hybrid organisations, including both on the 
more detailed level of dyadic interactions and dialogue, to consider how tensions are 
discursively handled and on the longitudinal level to see how micro and meso level 
negotiations relate to each other during extended contract periods, and indeed contribute to 
more macro level institutionalisation of sectoral boundaries and domains.  
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